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Improving Public Debt Management

In the OIC Member Countries

140

C) Policy Recommendations

It is recommended to further improve the institutional framework of public debt management

in Iran, clearly defining and making public the operations, members and competencies of the

newly created DMU. The relations and interactions between the various entities integrated in

debt management might also be strengthened. In particular, the precise division of

competencies between the DMU, the CBI and the MCC remains rather vague. This specifically

includes the tasks of the CBI which should remain its independence. Moreover, a transparent

legal framework for debt management is required (Hansen 2015). The development of a

general strategy for debt management and a mediumterm debt management strategy by the

DMU following international standards would make the framework more comprehensive.

One of the most pressing issues concerns collecting, managing and publishing debt data. For

example, government finance statistics should go beyond the coverage of the central

government and also include subordinate public entities. The role of semipublic institutions,

especially those lead by members of the military or religious community, may be better

clarified, given their importance with regards to economic activities and public debt holdings.

Statistics may be released more regularly (IMF 2015a). Although data on public and publicly

guaranteed debt is published, further improvements are still necessary as the classifications do

not meet the standards of the IMF External Debt Guide (IMF 2015b).

Moreover, more transparency regarding the supervision of the banking sector as a large

creditor to the government is recommended, at it currently lacks clear transparency on

ownership and operations. It is advisable to restructure the high number of nonperforming

loans and banks in general, and solve issues with unlicensed financial institutions, which are

partly responsible for these high borrowing cost rate levels threatening macroeconomic

stability (IMF 2015a). Given the importance of the banking sector for public borrowing needs,

the government should ensure sufficient liquidity in the market. This may be of special concern

given that banks mostly hold illiquid assets in the housing and construction sector, while

simultaneously managing comparatively high debt.

It is important to reevaluate the nexus between fiscal and monetary policy regarding the

concerns connected to the implementation of Islamic banking in Iran. The fact that the

government is the only actor that is allowed to borrow at a fixed rate, also influences the other

bank charges which are supposed to reflect actual profits of the borrowing entities (Iqbal and

Mirakhor 1987). Various solutions have been presented to solve this issue, among others the

replacement of the fixed rate by a variable rate of return tied to nominal GDP growth or the

allowance for the government to access a portion of the demand deposits at the central bank

on a noninterest basis (Iqbal and Mirakhor 1987). Despite these issues related to Islamic

banking practices, the IMF supports Iran’s transition from loan markets towards marketbased

approaches to finance government debt, which include explicitly the issuance of

sukuk

and

other Islamic debt instruments (IMF 2015a).

Finally, the expected lift of sanctions provides great opportunities for international

cooperation. Foreign direct investments may lessen the pressure on public accounts to finance

needed investments in the oil and gas sector. Moreover, it opens room for a deepened

economic cooperation within the region and with other OIC member states.