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Improving Banking Supervisory Mechanisms

In the OIC Member Countries

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5.7 Capital Conservation Buffer and Countercyclical Buffer in Islamic Banks

There are also two additional buffers set up by the Basel committee: a countercyclical buffer

and a capital conservation buffer in order to prevent a financial collapse.

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Capital Conservation Buffer

An important part of the capital conservation buffer should be composed of common equity

(Tier 1) assets. If the banks have not enough capital for this buffer, Basel 3 restricts the

distribution of dividends, share buybacks or bonus payments until the ratio of 7% is respected

(4.5% + 2.5%). Constraints on a bank’s discretionary distributions will be imposed when

banks fall into the buffer range.

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Countercyclical buffer

When banking authorities judge that credit growth is resulting in an unacceptable buildup of

systematic risk, an additional capital buffer will be required.

In these two requirements, Islamic banks neither have a competitive advantage nor

disadvantage against conventional banks. Therefore, the impact of capital conservation and

countercyclical buffer is neutral on Islamic banking.

5.8 What are the Core Principles Effective in Banking Supervision in Islamic

Banking?

As we discussed before, there are 29 core principles for effective banking supervision for

conventional banking. The adaptation of the revisions of Pillar 3 on market discipline with

respect to disclosure requirements (for securitization exposures, sponsorship of off-balance

sheet vehicles, and the components of regulatory capital) should not be a significant problem

in Islamic finance. However, a more fundamental systemic issue related to market behavior

became apparent during recent months when emerging markets experienced substantial

capital outflows and exchange-rate pressures – namely, a vulnerability of Islamic finance that

emanates from volatile Sukuk markets with the potential to “infect” Islamic banks and thus

spread throughout the whole IFSI.

A particular stability concern results from the quantitative asymmetry between the global

conventional industry and the Islamic finance industry: movements that are minor on the

global conventional finance scale can have major destabilizing effects for the much smaller

Islamic finance industry. Recent market turbulence that resulted in capital outflows and

pressures on the exchange rates of some IFSB member countries are powerful reminders of

the importance of macro-prudential oversight for the timely identification and assessment of

systemic risks and for appropriate policy measures whenever necessary. The quantitative

asymmetry suggests that macro-prudential supervision is of greater importance for the Islamic

segment of the financial system.

Along with the most important micro-prudential regulations issued for the banking sector, the

market turbulence of 2013 suggests the need to intensify or initiate more work on cross-sector

regulations and macro-surveillance. With the BCBS as the main strategic partner of the IFSB

for micro-prudential issues, the cooperation between the IFSB and the IMF could help to link

the latter’s macro-prudential initiatives with the work of the IFSB, hence contributing to the

IFSI’s greater stability and resilience.