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Preferential Trade Agreements and Trade Liberalization Efforts in the OIC Member States

With Special Emphasis on the TPS-OIC

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leading to a reduction of the external tariff. The common Customs Code has been in place since

mid-2010 and internal customs posts were abolished in mid-2011 enabling free internal flow

of most goods (USTR, 2013). Given that free trade agreements between the customs union

members were in place since 1990s the internal trade was largely duty free already prior to

customs union taking effect. This implies that the main change affecting members could be

related to the introduction of the common external tariff and potentially to customs union

affecting non-tariff measures, and trade facilitation.

As regards the former, adoption of the CET based on Russian tariff at the time implied a rise in

tariff levels for Kazakhstan. Calculations cited in World Bank (2012) suggest that the average

effective rate in Kazakhstan increased from 6.7% in 2009 to 11.1% in 2010 (see also table 26

showing an increase in simple average MFN rate from 5.1% in 2008 to 7.8% in 2012). The

World Bank (2012) used a computable general equilibrium model to assess the impact on

Kazakhstan to be a fall in real income per year in the range of 0.2%. This is explained by

increased protection leading to resources being shifted to less efficient production, with falling

real wages and declining real returns to capital. Trade diversion occurs with Kazakhstan

trading more with Russia and Belarus and less with the rest of the world including more

technologically advanced European Union. All this can be seen as a cost to Kazakhstan of

participating in the customs union that has been more recently reduced by Russia’s WTO

accession in mid-2012 and corresponding reduction of the customs union common external

tariff. The potential advantages from participation are related to the hope that trade

facilitation costs and non-tariff barriers to trade could be substantially reduced by the customs

union.

Table 26:

Average MFN and Preferential Tariffs Applied by Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia

Reporter

Partner

2000

2008

2012

Belarus

Kazakhstan /Russia (applied rate)

7.16/9.99

0

0

World (MFN)

9.95

9.11

8.08

World (applied tariff)

9.99

6.27

5.69

Kazakhstan Belarus /Russia (applied rate)

2.12/2.73 (2004)

0

0

World (MFN)

2.82 (2004)

5.07

7.81

World (applied tariff)

2.77 (2004)

3.56

4.82

Russia

Belarus /Kazakhstan (applied rate) na / 9.59 (2001) na/ 0

0

World (MFN)

9.94 (2001)

8.77

8.08

World (applied rate)

9.89 (2001)

7.34

6.15

Sources: WITS (TRAINS database - aggregated from 6digit data)

The World Bank (2012) model estimation suggests that this could lead to substantial gains to

real income to the tune of 1.5% annually. The question whether customs union will provide a

mechanism to lower trade barriers between Kazakhstan and Russia (Belarus is not an

important trade partner of Kazakhstan) remains open.