Improving Agricultural Market Performance:
Creation and Development of Market Institutions
93
4.5 Public Buffer Stocks for Food Security
Agricultural policies in many countries include the use of public buffer stocks of essential
agricultural commodities, with the twin objectives of food security and price stability. Beaujeu
(2016) cites “studies [that] tend to show that buffer stock policies are rarely effective in
achieving their objective of price stabilization and, even where they are, the effect on food
security for vulnerable households is weak at best. Such programs generally also represent a
significant cost to the public budget, and crowd out private sector activity in the storage
market.
Moreover, buffer stocks programs have given rise to major concern in multilateral negotiations
on agricultural trade liberalization in view of their potential effects on international
markets.”148
One problem with use of buffer stocks for price stabilization is that “most of the benefits
derived from price stabilization are…received by non-poor consumers and producers and are
‘leaked’ to high-income individuals.”149
Mali’s system of public buffer stocks illustrates some of the shortcomings of such an approach
to food security and price stabilization. Although food prices in Mali are overall less volatile
than in some neighboring countries, there are huge price swings between the pre-harvest
period (known as the “hunger season”), when food stocks are scarce and prices consequently
rise, and the post-harvest season, when food floods into markets and prices dip. There can be
as much as a 30% difference between prices in the two seasons. Imports can smooth price
fluctuations for commodities like maize and rice, which are widely traded internationally, but
not for sorghum and millet, the staple foods for a large segment of the rural population.
Mali’s national food and nutritional security policy (PoINSAN) is implemented by the Food
Security Council (CSA), the National Security Stockpile (SNS), which is largely responsible for
assuring food security in rural areas, and the State Intervention Stockpile (SIE), which is
responsible for guaranteeing supplies to urban and peri-urban areas.
A 2017 diagnostic study carried out by FAO150 indicated a lack of clear and well-conceived
policies and strategies and a predictable set of consequences.
 Rather than concentrate on millet and sorghum, the SNS has insisted on stocking a
diverse range of commodities.
 The SNS stockpile capacity of 35,000 tonnes is insufficient to meet the need in a crisis.
 A high volume of losses attributable to poor controls. Operating costs represent 13%
of the value of SNS purchases and 7% of that of SIE purchases.
 SNS makes one-third of its purchases in March, but sorghum and millet prices are at
their lowest between November and January. If purchases had been concentrated in
148 Beaujeu, R. (2016), “Alternative Policies to Buffer Stocks for Food Security”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers,
No. 97, p.4, Paris: OECD Publishing.
149 Beaujeu, R. (2016), “Alternative Policies to Buffer Stocks for Food Security”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No.
97, p.4, Paris: OECD Publishing.
150 Gourichon, H., & Pierre, G. (2017), “Améliorer l’efficacité et l’efficience de la stratégie de stockage public au Mali, ” Partie
2: Diagnostic. Rapport d’analyse de politique, SAPAA (Projet de Suivi et analyse des politiques agricoles et alimentaires), FAO:
Rome.