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Risk Management in

Islamic Financial Instruments

36

2.7 ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE RISK

Lastly, it is important to discuss the risks involved with Islamic microfinance. It may seem

counterintuitive, but there have been several important risks identified as being present

within the scope of Islamic microfinance. Islamic finance’s conventional counterpart,

conventional microfinance, which grew out of pioneering MFI institutions like the Grameen

Bank in Bangladesh, is still developing, though it is considered one of Islamic banking’s rapidly

developing subsectors. With goals of poverty alleviation and other core Islamic banking

concepts, microfinance seems, at least on the surface, to capture the beauty and essence of

Islamic finance. Microfinance institutions in the conventional market provide entrepreneurial

entities and individuals with capital critical to their ventures, something traditional banking

institutions (due to insufficient profitability projections and the reticence of banks to lend to

the poor) under pursue. If such persons get access to capital, it is often at the hands of vulture

lenders (who charge incredibly high interest rates with less than favorable lending terms).

While one would think many, if not all, Islamic banks would have arms that provide micro

financing that is not the case.

In some ways, the credit risks that one may find in conventional and Islamic non-microfinance

lending are alleviated to some degree by the group-based consciousness and team linkages

created by a repayment environment that is conducive to effective repayment (given the fact

that if the lending group is unable to pay back the loan monies, then they will not be given

loans in the future), so that the group will not be disallowed from receiving more loans.

However, that said, Ahmed, Ashraf, and Hassan (2002) state there are risks in providing credit

to poor in developing countries, namely the fact that there is no evidence to suggest that

providing poor people with credit will facilitate successful entrepreneurial projects (Hassan

and Ashraf, 2013). As for conventional MFIs, Rahman (1999) cites asymmetric information

issues and underlying moral hazard concerns, that is, that loan capital may eventually end up

in the hands of male family members to be used for purposes other than those intended.

Additionally, Bennett (1998) reports that high operating and administrative costs can range up

to 400 percent per dollar lent, making economic consume enduring and unpredictable (Hassan

and Ashraf, 2013). Liquidity pressures, too, are of concern to MFIs, due to the fact that, in

general, MFI loans are short-term, which is also a cause for higher interest rates (Hassan and

Ashraf, 2013). Besides the fact that charging fixed, even lower rates of interest to the poor may

seem logical, in practice, it is not so simple, as many projects do not offer rates of return that

are profitable enough such that the entrepreneurs can repay the principal plus interest, let one

make any surplus after covering their debt service (Hassan and Ashraf, 2013).

Comparison of Islamic and non-Islamic NGOs (Hassan and Alamgir, 2002)

Islamic NGOs are late in coming to the field of rural development in general and

microcredit/micro-investment in particular. On the other hand several hundred secular NGOs

have been implementing microcredit programs since 1980s. Discussions with leaders of

Islamic NGOs reveal that they were late to appreciate the roles of NGOs and in fact had hostile

opinions about activities of secular NGOs. Gradually some of them appreciated that credit

programs can be implemented by blending Islamic principles of investment and mechanism

of mobilizing the poor, that is, the management practice of implementing microcredit