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Risk Management in

Islamic Financial Instruments

123

CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. RISKMITIGATION AND REGULATION

IN ISLAMIC FINANCE

The following section was derived largely from Ahmed and Khan (2007). Risk identification

and management available in Islamic banks is of two types. The first type is comprised of

standard techniques, such as risk reporting, internal and external audit, GAP analysis, RAROC,

internal rating, etc., which are consistent with the Islamic principles of finance. The second

type, outlined by Ahmed and Khan, consists of techniques that either need to be developed or

adapted, while keeping in view the requirements for Shari‘ah compliance.

Gharar can be mild and sometimes unavoidable; however, it could also be excessive and cause

injustices, contract failures, and defaults. A number of appropriate contractual agreements

between counterparties work as risk control techniques. Ahmed and Khan cite:

“To overcome the counterparty risks arising from the non-binding nature of the contract

in murabahah, up-front payment of a substantial commitment fee has become

permanent feature of the contract. To avoid fulfilling the promise by a client in taking

possession of the ordered goods (in case of murabahah), the contract should be binding

on the client and not binding on the bank. This suggestion assumes that the bank will

honor the contract and supply the goods as contractually agreed, even if the contract is

not binding on it.”

Since the murabahah contract is approved with the condition that the bank will take

possession of the asset, at least theoretically, the bank holds the asset for some time. This

holding period is almost eliminated by the Islamic banks by appointing the client as an agent

for the bank to buy the asset.

In istisna, contract enforceability becomes a problem particularly with respect to fulfilling the

qualitative specifications. To overcome such counterparty risks, Fiqh scholars have allowed

band al-jazaa (penalty clause). Again, in istisna financing, the disbursement of funds can be

agreed upon on a staggered basis, subject to different phases of the construction, instead of

lumping them towards the beginning of the construction work. In several contracts, a rebate

on the remaining amount of mark-up is given as an incentive for enhancing repayment.

Fixed rate contracts such as long maturity installment sales are normally exposed to more risk,

compared to floating rate contracts, such as operating leases. Due to the absence Islamic courts

or formal litigation system, dispute settlement is one of the serious risk factors in Islamic

banking. To overcome such risks, the counterparties can contractually agree on a process to be

followed if disputes become inevitable. Specifically, Islamic financial contracts include choice-

of-law and dispute settlement clauses (Vogel and Hayes 1998, p.51). This is particularly

significant with respect to settlement of defaults, as rescheduling similar to interest-based debt

is not possible.

In order to manage interest rate risk, the use of GAP analysis and the use of two-step contracts

are advised. Since it is impermissible for a guarantee to be provided as a commercial activity