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Preferential Trade Agreements and Trade Liberalization Efforts in the OIC Member States

With Special Emphasis on the TPS-OIC

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the effectiveness of removal of barriers to trade as such, typically tariffs and quotas. For

example measures which prevent the sale of foreign made goods may negate any tariff

measures which allow for their import. Deep integration provisions may address technical

barriers to trade, competition rules, investment, trade in services, intellectual property,

government procurement and trade facilitation. They rarely cover taxation.

Deep integration obligations in FTAs require the removal or alleviation of such barriers or

measures. They are intended to go beyond WTO disciplines. However in most cases the

effectiveness of such obligations is severely limited; and therefore it is important to distinguish

between hard versus soft obligations - i.e. ones where an aspiration is indicated as opposed to

those where precise and binding commitments are laid down. To be effective an obligation

must be both binding and clearly enough specified to allow violations to be identified. Where

barriers are addressed the FTA may call for harmonisation or "approximation" (the actual

word used in the original Rome Treaty) of rules.

More common is the principle of National Treatment: foreign goods must be subject to the

same rules as domestic goods even where these differ across countries. Between these two

there is the principle of mutual recognition where standards and regulations in two or more

see Chauffour and Maur (2011) for an excellent discussion of the issues discussed in this

section and from which some of the material is drawn reductions are recognised as equivalent.

The EU sought to create its Common/Internal/Single Market on the basis of harmonisation but

in the 1980s moved to a preference for mutual recognition, though this may require some

basic approximation to permit equivalence to be agreed.

In some cases reading an FTA is difficult because they contain clauses that provide now for

consultation or cooperation on trade barriers with no binding effect but a provision that there

will be action in the future. The proposed EU-US TTIP agreement, if proceeds look unlikely to

eliminate deep barriers to trade but it is claimed that there would be provisions for the

eventual creation of joint regulatory systems. Some of the EPA texts which have only firm

provisions on trade as such contain "Rendez-vous clauses" for later negotiations on regulatory

matters. Horn, Mavroidis & Sapir (2010) argue that in practice EU relevant provisions of FTAs

are rarely made legally binding and even where they are they are rarely precise enough for

there to be any real scope for judicial enforcement (for which there are rarely provisions for

penalties.) Deep integration provisions of FTAs are thus often aspirational. We can observe

that even the apparently very strong EU Europe Agreements with prospective member states

rely for their teeth on the parallel accession negotiations: failure to apply the FTA rules will

delay EU accession.

Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade

Discussion on deep integration between countries frequently focuses on technical barriers to

trade. Provisions relating to the management of standards for the protection of human, animal,