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Preferential Trade Agreements and Trade Liberalization Efforts in the OIC Member States

With Special Emphasis on the TPS-OIC

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underlying technical issues and the consequences of the provisions. Other non-judicial

mechanisms, such as voluntary peer review and consultations, may also be appropriate. The

economic and human resources necessary to implement even a minimal regional decentralized

competition regime arrangement are significant for both developed and developing countries.

Nevertheless, the emerging evidence shows that the economic and welfare costs associated

with cross-border anticompetitive practices are higher. Short term political costs should be

weighed against the understanding that the long-term and sustainable benefits of a strongly

enforced regional competition regime will almost always outweigh its costs. Decentralized

agreements that only require the existence of a local competition law and authority to apply

the law, such as NAFTA, are not as economically demanding as a regime that establishes a fully

centralized law with a supporting regional authority, such as the EU or the Common Market for

Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

Investment Policy

In good part driven by increased supply chain fragmentation and by the growing recognition of

the importance of investment in the process of economic growth, regional trade agreements

increasingly incorporate investment provisions. This is often instead of negotiating bilateral

investment treaties (BITs) and is in recognition of the complementary relationship between

trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Investment provisions were one of the four

’Singapore issues’ that were originally supposed to become the new additions to the WTO in

the Doha negotiations (the other three were: trade facilitation, government procurement, and

competition policy). In good part the lack of progress in the WTO on these issues has increased

their adoption in regional trade agreements.

The investment provisions typically do not focus on simply on dealing with investment in the

post-establishment phase but also deal with the pre-establishment stage (i.e., market access,

national treatment, and most favoured treatment). In so doing they provide legal incentives

through the protection of investment once it has been undertaking, economic incentives for

investors in the form of market access. There are two main models of investment provisions in

PTAs, one following the NAFTA, and which places investment in goods and services industries

in the same chapter; and one that follows the GATS model for the provisions on investment in

services. In application, these two types of agreement tend to offer the same degree of

protection for investment and are equally liberalizing of investment.

Trade in Services

Most agreements typically focus only on trade in goods. More recent agreements such as in EU-

Mexico or in newer deeper agreements such as EU Korea also have some treatment of services.

GATS rules require there should be the equivalent of the substantially all trade provision of the

GATT ART XXIV. Generally there is a growing trend in PTAs to include provisions on

liberalizing cross-border trade in services, services-producing activities, and the temporary

movement of business people. Where services are included the focus tends to be on

professional services suppliers.