Preferential Trade Agreements and Trade Liberalization Efforts in the OIC Member States
With Special Emphasis on the TPS-OIC
14
There is no clear definition of "substantially all" and this is discussed in more detail later in
this report. However, it is commonly accepted to mean at least 90% of trade; with many
agreements extending this to (almost) all trade. Given that the trade liberalised is
"substantial", the effects on trade and on welfare are, in principle, expected to be more
important than with a PTA. Trade effects would depend, eventually, on many factors such as
the compatibility of the trade structures of the countries involved and/or the level of the
original tariffs being reduced. Negative or positive welfare effects depends, additionally, on the
efficiency of supply of the partner in the products to be imported. Additionally, as tariffs are
eliminated, tariff revenue will be reduced and this can be an issue for certain countries where
tariff revenue is a substantial component of government revenue.
Bilateral trade agreements involving one or more developed countries have to be notified to
the WTO under Art. XXIV and, consequently, they take the form of a FTA. Examples of these are
agreements involving the US (such as US-Jordan or US-Morocco) or the EU (EPAS or the EU-
Morocco). However, it is possible for developing countries to form FTAs and to notify them
under the Enabling Clause such as Chile-Colombia or Colombia-Mexico).
Customs Unions (CU)
In contrast to FTAs where each member retains the capacity of establishing the level of
the tariff applied to non-members, in a customs unions the member states agree on a "common
external tariff" (CET) which is then applied to all non-members of the agreement. Not only
there is free trade between its members (given the FTA element), there is also an agreed
common tariff applied to third countries. Therefore, as long as there is free trade between
members and a CET, the possibility of trade deflection is eliminated, thus also eliminating the
need for Rules of Origin. As tariffs applied are the same regardless of the applicant member,
there is no possibility of exploiting any difference between low and high tariffs applied. Once a
good enters one of the members, it becomes "national" of that trade agreement and it can
travel freely to the other members.
In order for goods to travel freely between members, there then needs to be an agreement on
the way that any tariff revenue collected would be shared among members. Duties collected on
goods imported from outside of the customs union need to be collected and shared somehow.
In most existing customs unions, customs revenues are collected and retained at the point of
consumption. This requires that imports into the customs union must travel in bond to their
final destination, where the tariff is then paid. This raises the administrative costs of importing
and may require the re-introduction of rules of origin to deal with imports that are
transformed within one country, which can undermine some of the economic benefits derived
from the customs union.
It is possible that the customs authority of the country where the product initially entered the
customs union collects tariff revenue and then transfers the revenue to the good’s final