Preferential Trade Agreements and Trade Liberalization Efforts in the OIC Member States
With Special Emphasis on the TPS-OIC
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5.6. POTENTIAL FUTURE MEMBERS
The TPS-OIC agreement is open to all members of the OIC; implying that the agreement can be
enlarged as members approve and ratify the three agreements. In fact, some countries are very
close to joining the agreement as either they have ratified one of the agreements or they need
to submit their concession lists. For example, Kuwait and Bahrain need to ratify the Rules of
Origin agreement whilst The Gambia, Iran and Morocco have signed and ratified all the
agreements and need to submit their concession list. The effect of potential members in the
TPS-OIC agreement is expected to depend on the amount of trade with the incumbent
members and with the new entrants. Although the different effects are typically different
manifestations of the same phenomenon, we separate out the analysis in order to identify the
effect on the incumbent members of new members joining the TPS-OIC; and the effect on the
new members of joining the TPS-OIC.
For the incumbent Contracting Countries of TPS-OIC, Table 59 shows the value and the share
of trade (in exports and imports) with the remaining members of the OIC that could become
members of the TPS. So for example if we take the first row we see that out of the total
Bangladeshi exports to the world 1.27% go to the rest of the OIC countries, and similarly that
17.215% of Bangladesh’ imports are sourced from these countries. In terms of exports, only
for Jordan, Pakistan and Turkey do the other OIC member countries represent a significant
market. For the other countries, the rest of the OIC Member States represent smaller shares. In
terms of imports, the share of the non-TPS OIC members is, in general, higher and this is
particularly the case for Bangladesh, Jordan, Pakistan and Turkey. This does suggest that
where there are significant tariffs, and should those products be included, that there could be
scope for some more significant trade impact. However, as seen in the country discussion
earlier, it is typically the case that the de jure level of reduction may be minimal both because
of the limited obligatory coverage in the agreement and because of the nature of the tariff
reductions as foreseen by the agreement.
Table 59: Share of the Non-TPS OIC Members in the Trade of the TPS Members Thousands of USD
Reporter Imports Share Exports Share
Bahrain (2011) 232,746 1.32% 601,823 2.78%
Bangladesh (2007) 3,024,237 17.21% 166,328 1.27%
Jordan 1,825,438 8.47% 2,511,277 37.06%
Malaysia 11,849,979 5.75% 16,760,190 7.33%
Oman (2012) 1,297,542 4.61% 1,488,698 3.26%
Pakistan 6,207,206 14.18% 3,566,153 14.25%
Qatar (2012) 1,306,555 4.24% 3,199,301 2.42%
Saudi Arabia (2007) 4,793,208 5.31% 8,912,820 3.88%
Turkey 21,408,154 8.51% 39,131,425 25.77%
United Arab Emirates (2011) 12,249,950 5.81% 5,128,910 2.63%
Source: Comtrade using WITS. 2013 data unless otherwise stated.