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Improving Public Debt Management

In the OIC Member Countries

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Furthermore, development and economic aid grants may be subject to constraints regarding

prespecified investment projects, thereby limiting the government’s policy space (see Panizza

2010). Therefore, in order to increase spending flexibility, it might be beneficial to increase the

share of debt held domestically. However, domestic debt tends to be more expensive than

external debt in developing countries. Insufficient transparency or a challenging political

environment increases the interest rates when governments turn from external (concessional)

financing to domestic debt financing.

Some countries may consider converting or rolling over Eurobonds into longterm domestic

currency liabilities, preferably in close cooperation and communication with their

international partners. Such a changeofstrategy could help in establishing muchneeded

domestic accountability channels to replace the weaker external accountability channels

resulting from a streamlining of conditionality of international financial institutions. The key

challenge here is resolving the time inconsistency problem associated with nominal debt

contracts. However, this may be innovatively resolved by allocating a share of the bonds for

civil servants as part of a civil service pay increase.

(3) Domestic borrowing

Domestic debt markets are an important source of financial funding for governments. A wellfunctioning domestic market for public debt helps to reduce the risks linked to public debt,

because it provides additional diversification opportunities. For domestic creditors it is easier

and less expensive to buy sovereign bonds if they are traded on the domestic market. Domestic

creditors, in turn, are a source of funding that reacts less to global market conditions and may

be less volatile than external sources. The domestic debt market might be strengthened by e.g.

improving legal and regulatory frameworks, promoting market infrastructure, maintaining

political stability and developing a predictable public debt management. Low and stable

inflation rates as well as an independent central bank may help to keep savings in the domestic

financial market. A high share of securities in the total domestic debt sector and a high share of

fixed vs. floating bonds usually describe a good quality of the domestic bond market (see also

Abbas und Christensen 2010).

Some OIC member countries are heavily indebted in the domestic banking sector. High interest

rates on government debt and preferences for safe lending reduce the incentives of banks to

provide credit to the private sector in these countries, leading to a crowdingout of bank loans

to the private sector. Since banks manage only a limited amount of savings, buying government

debt decreases their liquidity which otherwise could have been used to finance domestic

investment via credits to local firms or consumers. Banks tend to invest in shortterm

instruments to avoid asset and liability mismatches with shortterm bank deposits. This

increases interest rate risks and refinancing risks of the government’s debt portfolio.

When a substantial part of public debt is held by domestic banks, a vicious link between public

finances and the banking sector exists: public default would damage the banking sector and

difficulties in the banking sector endanger government’s success in placing its bonds on the

domestic market. Given that the domestic investor base is often limited, access to foreign

investors helps to break the vicious link between domestic commercial banks and the public

sector.

A domestic creditor composition with a large share of nonbanking investors is favorable

(Christensen 2005, Abbas and Christensen 2010). The investors’ base can be broadened by

reforming the legal framework to grant pension funds, insurance companies and foreign

investors access to the domestic debt market (Christensen 2005, Maana et al. 2008, Panizza