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Improving the Role of Eximbanks/ECAs in the OIC Member States

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4.2

Mandates and Operating Principles of OIC ECAs

The date of establishment of most of the entities in the OIC countries reflects the economic

context facing the country at the time, driven an increasing interest by governments to support

export development.

Most of the Arab economies such as Oman, Qatar, Iran and Saudi Arabia, which are highly

dependent on oil exports, recognized the need to diversify into non-oil sectors. Countries such as

Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Nigeria and Senegal aimed to increase their national exports and to

promote trade relations with new markets in the region and globally. In this context, Indonesia,

Kazakhstan, Turkey and Malaysia adopted a sector-focused approach by singling out such

sectors as coffee, rubber, manufacturing, industrial goods and other non-traditional markets in

their respective economies for export promotion, while others such as Pakistan and Albania

identified SMEs as instruments for expanding exports and aimed to improve access to SME credit

through their ECAs.

Some of the ECAs receive their mandates via their constitutive documents or Articles of

Association, while others infer their mandates from shareholder directives. Those with clear

legal mandates tend not to lose focus and become involved in extraneous activities, which

distract from the business of providing export credit facilities. A focused mandate with clear

operating principles provides a sound footing for the ECA to build its business.

A number of ECAs have a requirement not to compete with private sector sources of finance and

insurance – either explicitly in their constitutive documents, or as guiding principles. This is

primarily the case with the lenders within the ECA community, such as Turk Eximbank, Nigeria

EXIM, Malaysia EXIM, SEP of Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia Eximbank, which have specific

requirements not to compete with banks. It also applies to ASEI, the Indonesian insurer, but this

is more related to their general insurance business, for which competition exists. In some cases,

the ECA’s focus avoids catering to those markets of primary interest to commercial banks, i.e.

targeting instead the SME market segment, which is high cost and may be higher risk. In the case

of Indonesia, while there is not to be competition with the private sector, both Eximbank and

ASEI offer some overlap in their export credit insurance products.

The issue of competition is also relevant with regards to the multilaterals ECAs (ICIEC and

Dhaman) wherein some markets such as Jordan and Egypt, some large exporters felt that they

cannot be properly served by the national ECA, hence they sought help from one of the two

regional multilaterals. Or, indeed they resorted to the major international providers who are very

active throughout the OIC region and are becoming an important factor affecting the marketing

strategy and even the business model of many ECAs in the region.

Whether this non-competition requirement is theoretical or a practical point may differ by

institution. If practical, how this requirement gets operationalized by these ECAs is not clear, as it

would require a process of conducting regular market soundings to gauge the changing appetite

and capacity of the private sector. Moreover, an ancillary objective to not competing should be to

collaborate with commercial banks or private insurers, either through co-financing or provision

of guarantees, which help catalyse commercial bank involvement.

Although not typically embedded in statutes or legislation, a number of ECAs have some form of

a client service agreement, such as a charter, offering maximum response times.