Forced Migration in the OIC Member Countries:
Policy Framework Adopted by Host Countries
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the lowest socio-economic level of society where predictable social pathologies have
developed, such as domestic violence and youth marriages.122
An overarching price of Syrians’ temporary protection status is their uncertain position vis-à-
vis the medium and long-term future. The longer Syrians stay without adapting to Turkish
cultural norms and language, and the longer they remain marginalized and poverty-stricken,
the more ethnic tensions will persist. The long-term costs to Syrians of forced migration and
exploitation may prevent them from establishing stable lives in Turkey or successfully
rebuilding Syria, once they are able to return. Most worryingly, as child labor has become
widespread and hundreds of thousands of Syrian children remain out of school, the threat of a
“lost generation” is very real.123 Such a generation would neither be able to climb out of
poverty in Turkey, nor gain the skills to rebuild Syria. As the years pass and conditions in Syria
do not improve, questions about the future of Syrians inside Turkey grow more urgent. How
many Syrians will ultimately be integrated into Turkish society? Will the majority remain
segregated in the hopes that they will return home in the medium-term?
Looking to the Future
Turkey is at a crossroads in its policies and practices toward forced migrants. Turkish
policymakers seem to have recognized that the displaced people under their protection, the
Syrians being most important in numerical terms, are in Turkey for the long term, and are
adjusting their policies accordingly. The term “integration” is not used, but the shifts in law
and policy such as mainstreaming Syrian students into the Turkish school system and
allowing Syrians to apply for work permits demonstrate the shift from emergency response to
what the Law on Foreigners and International Protection calls “harmonization.” The concept
of harmonization expressed in the law is to equip beneficiaries of international protection in
Turkey “with the knowledge and skills to be independently active in all areas of social life
without the assistance of third persons in Turkey or in the country to which they are resettled
or in their own country” (Article 96). Turkish policies, including allowing most refugees (90
percent) to live outside of camps and making it easy to set up new businesses, give a head-
start to harmonization. But daunting challenges lie ahead.
Developing a long-term strategy for the incorporation of the 3 million protected persons is
important for several reasons. First, pathways for forced migrants to move on from Turkey to
Europe have been drastically narrowed. After the agreement of the EU-Turkey statement on
March 18, 2016, and —perhaps more importantly, the closure of the Balkan route from Greece
to Germany and other Western European countries—arrivals from Turkey to Greece declined
by more than 85 percent over the course of a single month. Second, widespread poverty has
begun to create societal division, and may lead to mutual resentment between Turks and
protected populations. Ostracizing Syrian communities may render them unable to contribute
to the Turkish economy or to rebuild their own country. Years of poverty and isolation could
open the door for social pathologies and even to violent reactions that would erode Turkey’s
security.
As Turkey’s protected populations become more entrenched in society, it is essential that they
develop the capacity to care for themselves. Strategic investments must be made in education,
training, infrastructure and public services. Greater coordination among ministries, different
122 ORSAM and TESEV, Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey, 16 ; Kirişci and Ferris, Not Likely to Go Home, 5 ; M. Murat
Erdoğan, Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research.
123 Grisgraber and Hollingsworth, Planting the Seeds of Success? Turkey’s New Refugee Work Permits ; Human Rights Watch,
‘When I Picture My Future, I See Nothing.’