Forced Migration in the OIC Member Countries:
Policy Framework Adopted by Host Countries
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employers’ profits increase when they hire cheaper workers; Turkish landlords make more
money by renting to Syrians; and Turks often engage in the construction of illegal additions to
buildings in order to make money by renting to Syrians.103 The increase in food prices due to
higher consumption strains the finances of many locals, but has pushed the demand curve
outwards, benefitting Turks who sell consumer goods.104 While many locals have felt the pinch
of the increased population, other Turks benefit from the new reality, and some exploit both
Syrians and fellow citizens.
A second major impact of the large forced migrant population has been the overburdening of
municipal services. As seen in Figure 11, the southern provinces of Şanlıurfa, Hatay and Kilis
have seen their populations increase substantially since the beginning of the mass influx. Each
of these provinces has at least one Syrian for every five Turkish residents, with Kilis’ near one-
to-one ratio the most striking. A 2012 report by Türkofed categorized these provinces among
the 27 poorest in the country before the arrival of Syrians.105 The budgets for public services
such as electricity, garbage collection, police, and hospitals have been established pre-crisis
and have not increased proportionately for towns whose populations have increased
significantly.106 The central funding structures for provinces and municipalities have not
funneled new money to the most affected areas since the influx, and so local services simply
cannot continue to function efficiently in this new reality.107
Two central outcomes have been influenced by a combination of negative perceptions of
Syrians, initial miscalculation of their length of stay, increased competition, and exhaustion of
municipal services.
Firstly, Syrians and Turks have self-segregated. This phenomenon is especially evident in
Gaziantep, which due to its commercial success is often considered a model for Syrian
integration.108 It undoubtedly results in part by normal preferences of Syrians to settle near
their own co-nationals in communities where they can speak Arabic and use commercial
services that cater to their preferences and income levels. But the fact is that Syrians and
Turks live apart, and attend either separate schools (with Syrians in the TECs) or the same
schools during different shifts. A 2015 study by RAND found that only 7 percent of Syrian
children share a classroom with Turkish children.109 Syrians in larger communities have also
started their own small businesses, such as bakeries and corner stores, which cater to their
compatriots and further diminish interaction between groups.110 The perpetuation of this
reality may result in two grave consequences. Locals risk being overlooked by Syrian
entrepreneurs who are bringing large investments and economic opportunities. Conversely,
the mix of impoverishment, isolation, and a lack of hope for a better future among residents of
Syrian communities may foment the spread of extremist ideologies.
Profound insecurity has also developed within both Turkish and Syrian communities across
the country. This insecurity has been provoked through attacks by militant groups on Turkish
civilians. Distrust of Syrians may also be fomented by Turkish media, who frequently report
103 ORSAM and TESEV, Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey, 16.
104 Ximena V. del Carpio and Mathis Wagner, The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Labor Market.
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106 ORSAM and TESEV, Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey, 9, 24.
107 Metin Çorabatır, in conversation with Kathleen Newland, May 25, 2016.
108 Serhan Alemdar, in conversation with Kathleen Newland, May 2, 2016.
109 Shelley Culbertson and Louay Constant, Education of Syrian Children, 17.
110 ORSAM and TESEV, Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey, 32-33.