Forced Migration in the OIC Member Countries:
Policy Framework Adopted by Host Countries
43
migrants are guided by a multi-faceted set of drivers that do not all fall under the 1951
Convention criteria.135 Some refugees may be able to adapt to conflict and political
marginalization, but are finally pushed to flee due to drought and food insecurity, or vice
versa.136
A key example of protracted displacement is Somalia, where a typically pastoral society has
been devastated by over 20 years of internal conflict, terrorism, governance failures, drought,
and food insecurity.137 Since the outbreak of civil war in 1988 and the resulting state collapse
in 1991, Somalia has seen several waves of displacement as conflict intermittently spread and
receded, sometimes exacerbated by drought.138 Recently, endemic violence between clans
vying for natural resources, as well as the activities of the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, have
spawned large vulnerable populations in South Central Somalia who are forced to seek help
elsewhere to ensure their survival.139 The large agro-pastoral community in south-central
Somalia has typically overcome economic shocks through internal migrations, but these
traditional strategies have been hindered by persistent violence. 140 Moreover, humanitarian
assistance to help recover from environmental shocks are unable to reach those most in need
due to endemic violence.141 Thus, communities whose livelihoods were affected by climate
change have no opportunity to move within the country, cannot receive humanitarian aid, and
consequently look abroad to ensure their survival.
Another substantial push factor is political oppression, most prominently seen in Eritrea,
where limited political freedoms and indefinite conscription, coupled with poverty and a lack
of livelihood opportunities, have led as many as 5,000 people to flee the country of 5 million
each month.142 Eritrea became a one-party state in 2001, leading to the suspension of the
constitution and elections, and a crackdown on opposition and the independent media. In
2002, the compulsory national service for all Eritreans between 18 and 50 was extended
indefinitely—conscripts report sexual assault, lack of food or pay, and dire living
conditions.143 Those who are caught fleeing or return after leaving the country risk prolonged
detention, torture, or even death. With little prospect of regime change, it is likely that flows
from Eritrea will continue; and faced with long-term displacement in neighboring countries
with limited livelihood or educational opportunities, some Eritreans are migrating further
afield to North Africa and Europe.144
Refugee Council, Durable Solutions: Perspectives of Somali Refugees (Copenhagen: Danish Refugee Council, 2013),
135 Christopher Horwood, Irregular Migration Flows in the Horn of Africa: Challenges and implications for source, transit and
destination countries, (Belconnen, Australia: Department of Immigration and Border Protection, September 2015), 7,
136 Anna Lindley, “Questioning ‘drought displacement’: environment, politics and migration in Somalia,” Forced Migration
Review no. 45 (February 2014): 39-4
137 World Bank Group and UNHCR, Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa, (Geneva and Washington:
World Bank Group and UNHCR, 2015), 20,
displacement-horn-of-africa-Report.pdf.
138 Hammond, History, overview, trends Somali displacement
139 United Nations News Centre, “Forced displacement in Somalia shows ‘no signs of easing,’ UN agency warns,” updated
September 16, 2014, Lindley, “Questioning
‘drought displacement’”
140 Lindley, “Questioning ‘drought displacement’”
141 Lindley, “Questioning ‘drought displacement’”
142 Christopher Horwood and Kate Hooper, Protection on the Move: A Case Study of Policy Responses to Eritrean Refugee
Flows in the Greater Horn of Africa (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, forthcoming 2016).
143 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2013 (Events of 2012), (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013), 108
144 Horwood and Hooper, Protection on the Move