Forced Migration in the OIC Member Countries:
Policy Framework Adopted by Host Countries
19
in the education system and the labor market. Although legal frameworks and regulations to
permit this have been issued, implementation has been slowed by concerns about competition
with native-born workers, the need to set up new implementing agencies, the capacity of
existing systems, and sensitivity to public opinion. Furthermore, in regions where protection
infrastructure is thin, such as Southeast Asia, governments may fear that developing such
infrastructure would make them a magnet for mixed migration flows.35
It is worth noting, however, that the 1951 Convention recognizes that large scale refugee
flows may place the capacity of asylum countries under strain. The preamble of the
Convention notes that "considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burden
on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations
has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without
international cooperation." The international community has, however, not always provided
assistance and support at the level needed, particularly for strained infrastructure in asylum
countries. Without adequate support, many countries may simply be unwilling or unable to
take on additional responsibilities. Moreover, asylum countries may fear that, in a time of
limited and dwindling humanitarian and development aid, taking on protection
responsibilities themselves may cause the small amount of international support they do
receive to disappear. This need for a reliable global responsibility-sharing system has gained
salience and captured international attention over the last year. Most notably, the UN General
Assembly has called a high-level meeting for September 2016 to propose a Global Compact on
forced migration that would commit states to pledging financial resources, technical
assistance, or resettlement places in response to a refugee crisis.36
1.4. Consequences of Forced Displacement and the Protection Regime
Despite the laudable success of the 1951 Convention and the associated refugee protection
regime in securing safety for some of the world’s most vulnerable, the system as it currently
operates has left significant gaps both for the displaced and the communities hosting them.
Most of the world’s refugees lack “durable” solutions to displacement, as well as limited access
to basic rights and services.37 Moreover, the disconnect between the reasons why people
move and the protection provisions of international law has resulted in a growing population
of forced migrants who are unable to return home, but also have no legal status or access to
protection.
For refugees, displacement, and particularly protracted displacement, often means a life in
limbo. Without the right to work legally, own property, or access certain basic amenities and
services (banking services, for example), refugees are often at risk of poverty or
marginalization. In Jordan and Lebanon, for example, 9 in 10 Syrian refugees are considered to
be living in poverty.38 The protracted nature of displacement means that the disadvantages of
poverty will likely be transmitted to the next generation. Children make up approximately half
35 Marie McAuliffe, Resolving the Policy Conundrums: Enhancing Cooperation on Protection in Southeast Asia. A case study of
policy responses to the May 2015 humanitarian crisis involving Rohingya and Bengali migrants. (Washington, DC: Migration
Policy Institute, 2016 forthcoming).
36 UN General Assembly, In safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugees and migrants: Report of the Secretary-
General (A/70/59, April 21, 2016)
37 As defined by UNHCR, durable solutions for refugees include voluntary repatriation, local integration within the host
community, or resettlement in another country.
38 Paulo Verme, et al., The Welfare of Syrian Refugees: Evidence from Jordan and Lebanon (Washington, DC: International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The World Bank, 2016), 14,
.