Forced Migration in the OIC Member Countries:
Policy Framework Adopted by Host Countries
18
asylum countries may face transition or turmoil unrelated to refugee flows that makes
prioritizing the development of protection infrastructure difficult at best.32 Some countries
find themselves in the unenviable situation of being both a source and a destination of forced
migrants, making the policy and political challenges of absorbing refugees even more complex.
The significant Syrian population in northern Iraq, for example, is dwarfed by the population
of IDPs.33
To take a related challenge, the service and social support infrastructure in many asylum
countries is underdeveloped and already suffering from a lack of capacity to meet the needs of
nationals. Incorporating large numbers of refugees, or other forced migrants, into national
education, health care, or social support mechanisms may risk stretching these systems to
breaking point or simply prove impossible. National services may also not be equipped to
serve refugees' often unique needs, including the need for language interpretation, different
educational backgrounds, or medical concerns such as trauma or post-traumatic stress.
Just as significantly, economic capacity to absorb large numbers of refugees and provide them
with the means to earn a living may simply not exist, at least in the short run, as many asylum
countries face their own economic and labor market challenges. Refugee hosting countries
that neighbor countries of conflict are often confronted with substantial economic disruption,
unrelated to refugee populations, due to the broader impact of instability in their
neighborhoods. Both Jordan and Lebanon, for example, have seen substantial negative
economic effects due to the loss of Syria as a trading partner and regional trade route.34 On the
other hand, refugee populations may be a source of economic stimulus in the mid-to-long
terms, bringing new skills, networks, and energies to hosting countries.
The manner in which flows occur, and the scale, mean that addressing them in a systematic
manner is a significant challenge even for the most well-developed asylum system or robust
economies (as events in Europe last year demonstrated). Comprehensive asylum and
integration systems are resource-intensive to operate—although the investments are
arguably very much worth the effort in the long-run—and in no country are they able to
effectively deal with massive inflows over a prolonged period of time.
Capacity issues—or even perceived capacity issues—can give rise to barriers of political or
public will that inhibit the provision of comprehensive rights to refugees and forced migrants.
Fears about competition between a country's nationals and newcomers may create political
liabilities for the government that make them hesitant to fully incorporate refugees in their
economic and social systems. In Turkey, for example, the government has acknowledged the
long-term nature of the situation and the need for the inclusion of people enjoying protection
32 In Tunisia, for example, the transition to a transit and destination country for migrants and refugees was in part driven
and accompanied by the country’s democratic transition. However, the delicate political situation in the aftermath of the
Arab Spring has complicated the adoption of needed policy reforms. Anaïs Elbassil, EU Cooperation with third countries –
Case study Tunisia (EPIM Project). Unpublished.
33 UNHCR registration figures suggest there were almost 290,000 Syrian refugees in Iraq as of June 2015, compared with
nearly 4 million Iraqi IDPs. UNHCR, “2015 UNHCR country operations profile – Iraq,” accessed December 18, 2015,
34 The economic impact of the Syrian crisis on the region provides a prime example. Syria was the fifth largest importer of
Lebanese goods prior to the conflict, and 20 percent of Lebanese exports (even those not destined for Syria) transited
through the country. The loss of Syria as a trading partner and transport route has had an impact on the health of the
Lebanese economy more broadly. World Bank, Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013),
; and World Bank, Jordan Economic Monitor: A Hiccup Amidst Sustained
Resilience and Committed Reforms (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group,2015),