Analysis of Agri-Food Trade Structures
To Promote Agri-Food Trade Networks
In the Islamic Countries
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Table 13: PreferenceMargin by Importing Group and Product, 2005 and 2016, Percent of MFN Rate
African Group Arab Group Asian Group
2005 2016 2005 2016 2005 2016
Live animals 3.33 25.10 27.77 73.05 0.84 7.45
Tobacco 2.16 39.44 75.31 68.48 1.16 24.66
Oil seeds 0.00 36.84 59.85 43.20 0.98 6.92
Crude rubber 0.00 34.78 34.58 51.85 0.71 9.92
Cork and wood 0.00 23.91 39.45 50.05 11.42 23.81
Rice 0.00 25.55 75.26 77.57 0.00 23.95
Vegetables 0.00 27.14 51.05 43.60 0.63 21.23
Fruit and nuts 1.04 22.39 39.62 49.67 0.28 7.39
Coffee 0.00 19.27 49.61 43.55 6.11 28.17
Other edible products 0.61 21.66 60.74 59.35 1.04 14.38
Cotton 0.00 42.86 45.87 46.87 0.00 22.07
Bread products 0.00 20.63 50.14 52.35 0.37 23.56
Palm oil 0.00 33.69 35.67 40.31 0.00 5.61
Fish and crustaceans 0.00 28.40 51.26 33.77 0.86 18.47
Cocoa and chocolate 1.21 23.29 43.48 48.00 1.58 14.37
Rest of 06 0.00 18.37 51.71 51.80 1.91 10.96
Source: TRAINS via WITS.
This policy analysis shows that the dynamic towards regional integration, as embodied in the
rise of RTAs involving OIC members, has played a strong and fundamental role in shaping trade
flows. Over time, the effective difference in the restrictiveness of policies facing RTA partners as
compared with MFN policies has grown substantially. In combination with geographical
considerations and product features, this fundamental dynamic has reinforced the tendency of
intra-OIC trade to take place within, rather than across, regional groups. As such, the network of
RTAs among OIC countries has been a defining feature of the multiple networks of trade flows
that are now in evidence.
In addition to formal trade agreements involving OIC members, there is also the Trade
Preferential System (TPS) Among Member States of the OIC (TPS-OIC). The legal basis for this
system is fully in place, and the instruments have been ratified by the required number of
countries. However, before the preferences can take effect, it is necessary for members to submit
updated concession lists; as of December 2017, seven countries had done so. Preferential
arrangements like this can potentially boost trade with beneficiaries, but as with any
discriminatory liberalization, policymakers need to pay attention to the dual effects of trade
creation and trade diversion. The same is true of regional agreements. Policymakers should craft
schedules of concessions designed to maximize reliance on low cost suppliers, i.e. maximize
trade creation. Accompanying enhanced preferences with multilateral rate reductions is a good
way of minimizing trade diversion—and this would be in keeping with the progressive
liberalization of tariff rates referred to above.