Activation Policies for the Poor in OIC Member States
15
measures means that most of the issues discussed in this section will mostly be relevant for high
income countries (depending on the extent of social safety net systems in middle and low income
countries). However, for countries without comprehensive social protection systems, the issues
discussed can nonetheless inform the development of systems in the future.
1.3.1 Direct interventions in the unemployment spell
The use of direct referrals of clients to vacancies by the PES is considered a useful tool in that it can
assist employers by speeding up the matching process, bring jobseekers that use inefficient job
search strategies into contact with vacant jobs and serve as a work-test.6 Referral to more intensive
labour market programmes also may act as a quasi-work test and assist participants in improving
their employability and other skills. In most countries, benefit recipients are liable to sanctions if
they fail to comply with a referral to an ALMP by the PES.
Mandatory referrals could be made to short job search assistance courses or to longer term work
experience or skills programmes. The risk with longer duration programmes can be that the
advantages of participation may be reduced by a ‘lock in’ effect as job search may cease or diminish.
Any lock in effect may also be offset by improvements in the subsequent employment and earnings
of programme participants especially in the case of vocational training where course completion is
required to achieve the particular skills and certification.
Activation requirements are often qualified by benefit regulations which, for example, typically allow
new claimants with skills and employment experience to limit the jobs they were expected to
consider. However, as unemployment durations increase, jobseekers are, at varying points according
to country, expected to consider other or all available jobs.
Other regulations allow claimants to limit the hours, conditions and locations in which they were
expected to take employment. The flexibility of these regulations has been amended in those
countries where parents with child care responsibilities or claimants with reduced work capacity
have been transferred to unemployment benefits. Other regulations allow for temporary or partial
exemptions from activation requirements if claimants work part-time or when there was ‘good
cause’, such as short-term sickness or participation in activities such as voluntary work experience.
Such changes are necessary to enable activation requirements to be extended to wider groups of
beneficiaries who have constraints on their availability or more limited work capacity. However, the
changes increase the diversity of unemployment caseloads.
A further feature of interventions in the unemployment spell concerns the sanction regime that
underpins them. Varying penalties can be incurred if those subject to job search requirements fail to
seek work, attend appointments or employment programmes, reject job offers or otherwise make
themselves voluntarily unemployed. Sanctions often are of fixed duration. However, where they are
designed to ensure compliance with activation requirements, they often escalate in severity but may
be suspended or withdrawn if the individual re-engages with the service and/or undertakes
specified actions.
When employment related sanctions are imposed there are often safeguards. This may be because
formal rules are designed to stop family incomes falling below a given subsistence level or specific
rules are designed to ameliorate the impact of any sanction on children in families or on otherwise
vulnerable clients.
One final development concerns the changes to work-related requirements that fall short of
immediate job search and work availability requirements. These ‘intermediate’ requirements reflect
the circumstances of claimants with reduced work capacity, such as people with disabilities or
6 OECD, OECD Employment Outlook 2013, available at
[accessed 6th January 2015].