Forced Migration in the OIC Member Countries:
Policy Framework Adopted by Host Countries
36
more migratory movements, including forced and non-forced migration, within West Africa
than towards European countries—despite an overwhelming focus on the latter in public
narratives.
84
These cross-border movements between neighboring countries have become
increasingly fluid, volatile, and circular amidst an uncertain political, economic and security
environment.
85
While the distinction between “forced” and “economic” migration is tenuous in all cases, this is
especially true in the West African region. Intertwined pressures at home—including political,
economic, demographic, and environmental instability—can lead residents to look to
migration as a solution. West Africa has a very young population coming of age in areas with
limited opportunities, causing them to migrate in search of regular employment or better
education.
86
This may be coupled with and exacerbated by the depletion of resources due to
droughts, desertification, deforestation, coastal erosion, and flooding, all of which combine to
limit the livelihood opportunities available in the region.
These environmental and economic factors often lead to conflict and political instability,
triggering forced migration. In a 2013 survey of migrants arriving in Morocco from 13 (mostly
West African) countries, 22 percent of respondents reported experiencing conflict or political
persecution.
87
For example, less rainfall in Mali has led to drought and chronic food shortages,
fraying social tensions.
88
In 2012, long-standing political tensions between the northern and
southern regions of Mali descended into a separatist war between Tuareg rebels, joined by
various groups, and the Malian government, forcing more than 140,000 Malians to flee the
country and displacing 350,000 Malians internally at its peak.
89
As of July 2016, about 60,000
Malian refugees resided in Niger, 41,000 in Mauritania and 32,000 in Burkina Faso.
90
The end of open hostilities does not necessarily signify the end of displacement. Though the
Algiers Accord signed in June 2015 formally ended the conflict in northern Mali, the number of
Malian arrivals in Niger spiked in October and early November 2015. Migrants cited
lawlessness, extortion, food shortages, inter-group rivalry and fighting, and the lack of a
component-crisis-sahel ;Florianne Charrière and Marion Frésia,
West Africa as a Migration and Protection area
, (Geneva:
UNHCR, November 2008), 7,
http://www.unhcr.org/49e479c311.pdf ;Benattia, Armitano, and Robinson,
Irregular
Migration between West Africa, North Africa and the Mediterranean
, 22
84
Charrière and Frésia,
West Africa as a Migration and Protection area
, 2
85
An UNHCR study based on field surveys conducted in Ghana and Senegal observed that migration journeys in the mid-
2000s had become more “individualized” and complex than traditional patterns of mobility based on ethnic or village
solidarity. This phenomenon was the result of many factors, such as increasingly common police round-ups of migrants,
economic difficulties in the traditional migration poles (namely Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Nigeria), and the outbreak of
conflict in certain countries. Charrière and Frésia,
West Africa as a Migration and Protection area
, 11-12
86
IOM,
IOM Response Plan for the Mediterranean and Beyond
, (Geneva: IOM, October 2015), 35
87
Cherti and Grant,
The Myth of Transit: Sub-Saharan Migration in Morocco
, 3
88
Average rainfall in Mali has dropped by 30 percent since 1998. Chris Arsenault, “Climate change, food shortages, and
conflict in Mali,”
Al-Jazeera
, updated April 27, 2015,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/04/climate- change-food-shortages-conflict-mali-150426105617725.html .89
Adam Nossiter, “Qaddafi’s Weapons, Taken by Old Allies, Reinvigorate an Insurgent Army in Mali,”
The New York Times
,
February 5, 2012
, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/world/africa/tuaregs-use-qaddafis-arms-for-rebellion-in- mali.html?_r=0 ;IOM,
The Mali Migration Crisis at a Glance
(Geneva: IOM, 2013),
https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/Mali_Migration_Crisis_2013.pdf;IDMC, “Mali IDP Figures
Analysis,” accessed July 25, 2016
, http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/mali/figures-analysis.90
Just over half of the refugees in Niger are female; nearly two thirds (62 percent) are under the age of 18. The vast majority
live in official camps (55 percent) or refugee hosting areas (36 percent), a new concept designed by UNHCR that allows
refugees to settle freely with their livestock in a large, defined pastoral area. UNHCR, “Sahel Operation: Information Sharing
Portal,” accessed August 9, 2016
, http://data.unhcr.org/SahelSituation/country.php?id=501 ;UNHCR, Synthèse Globale des
données des réfugies maliens au Niger, updated April 30 2016,
http://data.unhcr.org/SahelSituation/region.php?id=67&country=501;and
UNHCR, “Intikane Hosting Area Camp Profile,”
updated July 2014
, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/131025NGRIntikaneCampProfile.pdf.