Risk & Crisis Management in Tourism Sector:
Recovery from Crisis
in the OIC Member Countries
127
insecurity and high-profile military presence were deterrents to less resilient market segments.
This was reflected in the decline in annual arrival figures, from560,000 in 2006 to 448,000 in 2009
(Table 5.4).
Table 5.4: International Visitor Arrivals and Foreign Exchange Earnings – Sri Lanka
Year Tourist Arrivals (‘000s) Foreign exchange earnings
(US$ Million)
1995 403 225.4
1996 302 173.0
1997 366 216.7
1998 381 230.5
1999 436 274.9
2000 400 252.8
2001 337 211.1
2002 393 253.0
2003 501 340.0
2004 566 416.8
2005 549 362.3
2006 560 410.3
2007 494 384.4
2008 438 319.5
2009 448 349.3
2010 654 575.9
2011 856 838.9
2012 1,006 1,038.3
2013 1,275 1,715.5
2014 1,527 2,431.1
2015 1,798 2,980.6
2016 2,051 3,518.5
Sources: Tourism growth trends, 1970-2016; SLTDA statistics and annual reports; UNWTO
Even apart from these obvious causes of sector under-performance and before the 2004 tsunami,
it was acknowledged that tourism to Sri Lanka was not fulfilling its potential in terms of its
contribution to foreign exchange earnings, numbers of tourists, and the diversity of market
segments. Some of the reasons for this will be discussed below, after an overview of structural and
market aspects are provided.
The principal government organisations concerned with tourism at the time of the 2004 tsunami
were theMinistry of Tourism and the Sri Lanka Tourist Board (SLTB), which report to the Ministry.
Other key institutions were the government-run Sri Lanka Institute of Tourism and Hotel
Management, and private sector associations such as the Tourist Hotels Association of Sri Lanka,
which works with the government on policy and with other trade sectors, and functions as a
marketing organisation. Several of the larger destinations also had their own associations: for
instance a stakeholder analysis at the west coast resort town of Hikkaduwa in 2007 found at least