Strengthening the Compliance of the OIC Member States
to International Standards
119
The first point to note is that the EAC standard introduces a quality-based grading system that was not
present in Kenya (or indeed in any EAC country) prior to harmonization. The broad nature of this
system is in keeping with practice in the industry, although precise requirements vary according to local
conditions. Second, in some important respects, the harmonized East African standard is stricter than
the previous Kenyan standard—in particular for high quality Grade 1 maize, but also in some cases for
the lower quality Grade 2 product. Indeed, in some cases the EAC standard is even stricter than what is
required by the codex. The rationale for this divergence is not immediately apparent, but it has
frequently been noted that harmonization tends to be “up” in the sense of resulting in more restrictive
standards than those that existed prior to harmonization. The reason has to do with the political
economy of harmonization: no government wants to be seen as “lowering” national standards so as to
allow better access for “inferior” foreign varieties. As a result, there is pressure to move to standards
that mirror the most restrictive requirements in place among the harmonizing group.
Although there could conceivable be benefits for Kenyan consumers in having higher quality maize in
the market, Keyser (2012) notes a major disadvantage: the East African standard is not in line with
other standards prevailing in the region, particularly those in Zambia and South Africa. The Zambian
system is of particular interest because as of 2012, that country had the world’s largest surplus of non-
genetically modified maize available for export. However, a significant proportion was produced by
smallholders, who often face difficulties in producing non-discolored maize due to sun bleaching. The
East African standard—which was stricter than both the Kenyan standard and the Codex on
discoloration—therefore probably prevented some trade from taking place between Zambia and Kenya,
despite significant demand for maize in the latter for both commercial and humanitarian purposes. This
example illustrates that harmonization is not always and necessarily a trade facilitating measure: the
substance of the harmonized standard matters. In addition, this example shows that although regions
can move more easily towards harmonization than more disparate groups, it can sometimes be at the
expense of exports from third countries—an undesirably side effect of the process from a global welfare
point of view. Harmonization cannot therefore be seen as a panacea for reducing standards related trade
costs, but is instead one approach that—if implemented on the basis of sound analysis and a
consideration of its full range of effects—can potentially bring some benefits if the costs are
simultaneously minimized.