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Improving Agricultural Market Performance

:

Creation and Development of Market Institutions

58

its own losses in commodity markets, thus amplifying, rather than mitigating, the

effects of commodity price swings.

7.

Successful commodity exchanges should be closely linked to systems for physical

storage and delivery of commodities as well as for standardizing and grading the

quality of commodities on which futures contracts are based.

8.

Countries with small populations and a small number of potential market participants

are unlikely candidates to establish successful commodities exchanges. The example of

SAFEX, however, is a potential model as a regional exchange, which trades contracts

for delivery in other countries, as the example of Malawi maize futures illustrates.

9.

Appropriate use of technology is likely to make cross-border futures trading more

common, though this may entail potential regulatory and enforcement risks.

Nevertheless, to the extent that cross-border futures contracts can reduce the need or

temptation for governments to maintain buffer stocks of food staples or to act as

market participants rather than regulators, it is worth pursuing mechanisms to

increase their use.

2.6 Reflection

Governments have used market institutions as instruments to administer, regulate, coordinate,

and optimize agricultural market systems. These market institutions have been implementing

various policies, ranging from price and quantity restrictions (e.g. through marketing boards)

to direct intervention in the market (e.g. through public warehousing systems, and state-

owned economic enterprises) with the objective to realize policy objectives related to equal

access to and distribution of food, reasonably-priced food, food security, and general efficient

and coordinated agricultural market system.

This Chapter has furthermore shown the way Governments have used market institutions as

tool to intervene has changed, particularly from the mid-19

th

century onwards. Government

intervention reached its peak in the 1970s. It became more paramount in the late 1970s and

1980s that many of these inefficient and unsustainable market institutions actually impeded

and restricted agricultural market systems. Many Governments started reforms, withdrew

from agricultural market systems, and liberalized their agricultural market systems.

However, the economic and political liberalization of the agricultural market system did not

always realize the desired improvement. As such, the paramount view moved towards “getting

the institutions right” through the late-1990s and early 21

st

century, also in response to

excesses created by private-sector led market systems in combination with the emergence of

CSR, SDGS, and sustainable corporate practices. Government intervention and agricultural

market institutions re-emerged to mitigate market failures and to address issues related to

food security, oligopolistic multinational market power, and a dual market system, where an

efficient agricultural market system is only accessible for market participants with the right

size, scale, and skills, leaving out smallholders.

However, the success, degree, and scope to which these market institutions have revived differ

from country to country: