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Improving Agricultural Market Performance:

Creation and Development of Market Institutions

143

Classification

Institution

Description

operations, obligations, and requirements as specified by

Law No. 9/2009 and Law No. 9/2011.

436

Supervising Indonesia’s commodity futures trading market.

Physical settlement of agricultural products accounts for just

5%, while the remaining 95% is settled through future

commodities, where the WRS receipt may be traded at

commodity exchange platforms and markets. COFTRA

oversees these transactions.

Regulating 14 auction markets across Indonesia. Buyers and

sellers of agricultural commodities come together and,

hence, determine the commodity price through physical

settlement. This agreed price functions as the reference price

for commodities in the entire region.

Source: Investment Consulting Associates – ICA (2017)

5.4.3 Effectiveness of Agricultural & Food Market Institutions

The Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s disrupted three decades of steady progress in

Indonesia’s agricultural development.

437

The Government of Indonesia has exploited a variety

of policy instruments before, during, and after the Asian Financial Crisis and implemented

these through the selected market institutions (e.g. BULOG).

438

These mainly include market-

distorting forms of support such as subsidies, which benefit a wide range of commodities, and

trade or border interventions complemented with market price support to stabilize food

prices for a number of specific commodities (e.g. rice and sugar) and the RASTRA/RASKIN

“rice for the poor” rice distribution program. Market prices for export-orientated estate crops

(e.g. rubber, palm oil, tea, coffee, and cocoa) remains determined by the market.

439

Together, these agricultural forms of support required US$2 billion of public money in 2014.

440

In fact, a recent OECD study showed Indonesia’s rice prices went up from just 8% above

international prices in 2000 to 2002 to 60% in 2010 to 2012. Undernourishment is not

considerably reduced by input subsidies, while price support measures actually worsened

undernourishment. The RASKIN (now RASTRA) rice distribution program only reduces

undernourishment with 1.3% percentage points and does not offset the negative impacts of

the rice market price support. In fact, most agricultural policy support has increased individual

commodities’ prices in an attempt to increase production, thereby hurting the (poor)

consumers.

441

It is complex, however, to determine these policies’ exact impact on the effectiveness of

agricultural (sub-)sector(s) as market interventions have changed over time, ranging from

occasional bans and export taxes to export subsidies.

442

436

FFTC-AP (2015), Warehouse Receipt Scheme Policy in Indonesia, available a

t http://ap.fftc.agnet.org/ap_db.php?id=390

[Accessed June 2017].

437

International Trade Centre (2017), Country Profile Indonesia, available a

t http://www.intracen.org/exporters/organic- products/country-focus/Country-Profile-Indonesia/

[Accessed June 2017].

438

OECD (2010), “Policies for Agricultural Development, Poverty Reduction and Food Security,” Paper presented to the

Working Party on Agricultural Policy and Markets, 15-17 November 2010, Paris: OECD.

439

Interview conducted with Ministry of Agriculture in Jakarta, July 13, 2017

440

OECD (2015), Indonesia Policy Brief – Agriculture, available at

https://www.oecd.org/policy-briefs/indonesia-agriculture-improving-food-security.pdf

[Accessed June 2017].

441

Ibid

442

OECD (2010), “Policies for Agricultural Development, Poverty Reduction and Food Security,” Paper presented to the

Working Party on Agricultural Policy and Markets, 15-17 November 2010, Paris: OECD.