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Improving Public Debt Management

In the OIC Member Countries

2

domestic creditors (76.2% in 2015), middleincome countries divide their financing needs

almost equally between both types of investors and lowincome countries’ debt is mostly held

by external creditors.

Interest rate risk

arises for contracts with short maturities or variable interest rates. While

highest in highincome countries, the share of variable rate contracts is generally small.

Governments may receive

credits on concessional terms

, in particular from official creditors

as a form of development aid or in support of local reforms. This grant element in public debt

has been rising over time and amounted to 50% in 2014. The average interest rate of public

debt is often lower than the lending rate to the private sector, which might be explained by the

importance of concessional lending to governments.

Debt Management Offices (DMOs)

are typically responsible for funding operations, for

analyzing and monitoring risks, for the settlement of transactions and for keeping financial

records up to date. The existence of a principal debt management entity with clear objectives, a

mediumterm strategy and the requirement to report to parliament or government is generally

considered as best practice in public debt management.

The DMO as part of the overall

institutional structure

may be a department of the Ministry of

Finance, an office within the central bank or an independent agency. A clear separation of

assigned responsibilities for monetary policy and for debt management is a precondition for

accountable institutions; this suggests separating the DMO from the central bank. If the

recruitment of trained portfolio managers from the private sector has priority, independent

agencies outside of other official institutions, socalled separate debt management offices

(SDMOs), might be established.

If public debt management is located within the central bank, it faces

conflicts of interest

between monetary policy and public debt management

. A clear allocation of the

responsibilities for monetary policy and debt management, which is a precondition for

accountable institutions, therefore suggests dividing these policies between two institutions.

An efficient

governance structure

requires that DMOs follow a clear mandate with welldefined objectives. Potential targets are the allocation of public debt in domestic and external

currency debt, the division between fixed and floating interest rate debt and the percentage of

total debt that has to be refinanced within twelve months. This helps to improve accountability

and to limit principalagent problems. Active trading based on benchmarks is rather absent in

global best practices.

There are competing views on the

aims of public debt management

: as a form of portfolio

management, costs are minimized for given risks (narrow view). Alternatively, when taking

revenues into account, public budget management has to prevent mismatches between

revenues and debt payments (broad view). This strategy focuses on budgetary risks and aims

at reducing financial risks by guaranteeing that government can meet its obligations at any

point in time. As such, it

coordinates

public debt management

with other public policies

.

A World Bank survey conducted in 2013 shows that 60% of the responding countries had a

formal debt management strategy in place. 77% of those with formal strategy published it,

76% aimed at strategic targets, 71% used quantitative analysis and only a minority grounded

the strategy on a legal framework.