Forced Migration in the OIC Member Countries:
Policy Framework Adopted by Host Countries
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The direct assistance available to forced migrants -either from national governments, local
NGOs, or the international community- can vary widely. Most major refugee hosting countries
lack sufficiently robust social assistance systems to serve even their own nationals. And even
where such systems do exist and are accessible to protection beneficiaries, as in Sweden, they
can be overwhelmed by a rapid influx of new arrivals. In most countries, humanitarian
organizations and NGOs thus step in to fill gaps in services not provided by national
governments.
In some countries, most refugees live in camps or settlements, while in other places the
majority live in urban areas. In Uganda, most refugees live in settlements (with only 14
percent registered in the capital city), while in Turkey only a small percentage of refugees live
in camps. Often it depends on the nationality of the displaced: In Jordan, Iraqis are highly
urban and nearly 90 percent live in the capital city.
Humanitarian organizations like UNHCR play an indispensable role in providing shelter, food
assistance, and even education in most refugee-hosting states. However, while these efforts
are critical to emergency relief, many of these programs have fallen short in terms of
developing long-term, sustainable livelihoods for displaced persons. Even with innovative
practices in some countries -such as Uganda offering farmable plots of land to newly arrived
refugees- few refugees achieve a high degree of self-sufficiency in the long run. This illustrates
a larger problem, which is that many interventions are insufficiently targeted to the actual
capabilities of refugees and to the local context in which they are implemented (particularly
needs within local labor markets). In addition, the multiplicity of different actors (who are not
coordinated in a systematic way) risks creating parallel service infrastructures—with danger
of both duplication and service gaps.
The case studies show that implementation can lag behind policy design, sometimes leaving a
gap between the reality for forced migrants on the ground and the rights guaranteed to them
on paper. Access to work permits, for example, does not always translate to easy access to
jobs. In Turkey, only a small fraction of Syrians have entered legal employment (despite
gaining access to the labor market in January 2016); while in Uganda, employers’ divergent
interpretations of the 2006 Refugee Act have deterred many from hiring refugees. Meanwhile,
practical barriers such as language differences and a mismatch between skill levels and the
needs of the labor market can be another barrier, as seen in Sweden’s highly advanced
economy. The cost of obtaining documentation can also be an issue. Permit fees in Jordan
prevented many refugees and employers from applying for legal authorization to work.
Therefore, even in countries that offer a legal path to employment, many workers and
employers alike choose to circumvent these systems and resort to informal or “black market”
employment in practice. Better understanding the intersection between forced migration and
the role of labor markets in socioeconomic development will be critically important for
poverty alleviation strategies.
Practical barriers can also hamper access to critical services such as education and medical
care, even when these are provided to refugees. Enrollment or service fees may be prohibitive
for refugees without a reliable source of income, and service providers may lack the
knowledge or capacity to serve a population with unique needs, such as diverse linguistic
backgrounds or disrupted educational trajectories. A lack of access to education and medical
care can be particularly problematic for the 50 percent of refugees who are children and at a
critical stage in their physical and mental development.