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Increasing Broadband Internet Penetration

In the OIC Member Countries

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VI.2. OIC Member Countries at an intermediate stage of broadband

development

Countries with advanced coverage but limited penetration face classical demand gap reduction

challenges. First and foremost, governments have to recognize that increased service adoption

is dependent on lowering the total operating cost incurred by consumers for purchasing the

technology.

As it has been considerably researched, the development of competition is one of the major

tools for affecting a reduction in telecommunications service pricing. The following features

characterize a telecommunications competition model:

Existence of multiple operators serving the same market based on their own network,

Existence of multidimensional competitive dynamics (prices, services and user service

quality) among industry players,

Reduction of retail prices for consumers, and intense competition in product

differentiation (dynamic efficiencies), resulting in additional consumer surplus,

Competitive stimulation for each operator to increase the level of investment in its

own network,

Absence of tacit collusion between operators due to the high rate of innovation and

competition based on product differentiation.

Along these lines, it is important to emphasize that in order to determine the existence of an

adequate level of competition capable of yielding low broadband prices, the regulators need to

have access to expertise in market analysis capable to establishing whether the number of

players in the market are sufficient to warrant enough consumer benefits or whether

additional remedies are required to stimulate competitive intensity. This aspect is particularly

critical because unrestricted competitive entry of broadband providers could result in a

number of market inefficiencies (for example, low incentives to invest under low market share

conditions) and/or frictional costs (the costs incurred by carriers entering and exiting the

market after facing unsuccessful competitive strategies, as was the case of the wireless

industry in Cote d’Ivoire).

Beyond, competition as a lever for price reduction, governments should consider reducing the

taxes incurred by consumers when purchasing broadband services. For example, in Cote

d’Ivoire the acquisition of handsets is levied by 18% in value-added tax, 5% in customs duty,

and 2.5% in sector specific taxes. On the other hand, the service use is levied by 18% in value

added tax

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. In general terms, since high taxation increases the total cost of ownership of

wireless services, it is correct to consider that higher wireless consumption taxes will raise the

affordability barrier and reduce adoption. In this context, taxation could have a detrimental

effect on the public policy strategy aimed at deploying mobile broadband. If taxes limit

adoption of wireless broadband, it is relevant to ask what the ultimate impact of reduced

penetration might have on economic growth. Hypothetically, it is safe to assume that a

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These levies are documented in the International Telecommunications Union Eye database and have been analyzed in

Katz (2015).

The impact of taxation on the digital economy

. Geneva: International telecommunications Union.