Risk & Crisis Management in Tourism Sector:
Recovery from Crisis
in the OIC Member Countries
31
Apart fromthe direct costs of property damage and lost tourist income, there are indirect costs such
as loss of employment and the diversion of foreign investment and short term capital flows, while
the downturn in spending means that the destination’s ability to repair damaged installations is in
turn reduced as well as resulting in economic hardship for local people who depend on tourism.
Estimates of the total costs of terror attacks range from US$ 438 million for the 2013 Boston
bombings to €2 billion for the 2015 attacks in France (Misrahi, 2016). Similarly, the 2011
earthquake affecting Christchurch, New Zealand, led to a drop of 73% in international tourism
demand (Orchiston et al, 2016), while the Bali nightclub bombings of 2002 resulted in a 50% drop
in tourist arrivals in the six months following the attacks, with one third of workers affected by job
losses and three-quarters of hotel workers made redundant or put on reduced hours (Hajibaba et
al, 2016). Further examples are given in Sections 4 and 5.
1.6.2. Extent and Speed of Recovery from Crisis
The question of whether crises have a ‘beginning’ and an ‘end’ is sometimes asked, but the answer
is not straightforward. Clearly, when an event such as the Icelandic volcano eruption or the 2004
Indian Ocean Tsunami occurs there is little warning and the ‘start point’ appears obvious – except
that with modern monitoring systems it is now often possible to predict unusual events in areas of
significant tectonic activity. In the case of societal and political events there is often a build-up of
tensions over a period, during which national crisis management agencies and tourism-specific
bodies (both public and private sector) should be on the alert. Sadly, the increasing frequency of
one-off terrorist attacks means that such institutions and enterprises need constantly to be on the
alert. In the case of long-running crises, such as the civil war in Sri Lanka or the ongoing tensions in
South Africa within government and between government and civil society, it is again generally
hard to pinpoint a particular ‘start’ date, especially at the time of the crisis – even though later
analysis may decide on a date, with the benefit of hindsight.
It is even more difficult to ascertain when a crisis is ‘over’, and rarely possible to do so. In the case
of natural disasters it could be said that the crisis of ‘over’ when the infrastructure is rebuilt,
displaced persons are rehoused, and tourism arrivals return to pre-crisis levels – but generally
there will be some lingering memory of the disaster in people’s minds, and the infrastructure is
highly unlikely to be rebuilt in exactly its previous form. In 2003 a flash-flood devastated the
tourism village of Bukit Lawang, in the Indonesian province of North Sumatra, with the loss of over
200 lives. The village had grown organically over three decades into a sprawling, unplanned mass
of guesthouses and shops. After the event, the government took steps to allow reconstruction on a
more planned basis, with additional river management works to ensure better flood control in the
future.
In the case of terrorismor civil unrest it can take years for tourismnumbers to return to normal. As
will be shown in Sections 2 and 3, the duration of the effect of events may be of relatively short
duration given appropriate remedial actions, including infrastructure repair, security
improvements and reassuring communications. This can rectify the negative image and bring the
sector back to normal operations within the short-to-mid-term, as will be seen in the case studies –
althoughwhere the context of the country is still seen as dangerous recovery is likely to take longer.