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Preferential Trade Agreements and Trade Liberalization Efforts in the OIC Member States

With Special Emphasis on the TPS-OIC

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rather than the usual hub- spoke relationship present, particularly, when outward processing

is considered. Additionally, (Gasiorek, Augier and Lai-Tong, 2009) suggest that developed

countries should enforce rules of origin only when FTA’s partner external tariff are lower.

SPS and TBT Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)

measures are probably the most significant non-tariff measures affecting trade. Although they

frequently act as barriers against foreign competition and may discriminate in favour of

domestic suppliers; they also may respond to genuine domestic political goals such as to

correct market failures (such as asymmetric information in the case of labelling) or may

address non- economic objectives such as the protection of public health and/or animal

welfare. 10 However, although they may not have the objective of discriminating or protecting

domestic suppliers, they frequently favour domestic producers. In fact, SPS and TBT

represented 11% and 12%, respectively, of the reasons for dispute settlement (World Trade

Report, 2012)

Therefore, the main objective of including provisions on SPS and TBT in FTAs tends to

be the introduction of disciplines to facilitate the fulfilment of the necessary technical

requirements. In particular, agreements tend to include provisions on the adoption of common

standards or rules, mutual recognition and conformity assessment. Although only 60% and

67% of FTAs surveyed included TBT and SPS provisions respectively; after the conclusion

of the Uruguay Round, less than 15% of agreements during the 1990s and 2000s did not

include such provisions (Baccini, Dur, Elsig, Milewicz, 2011). It is not very frequent to see

provisions for the adoption of common set of standards in FTAs. These type of disciplines are

more likely in deeper agreements such as the European Union. It could be seen also in some

customs union such as Mercosur, although their scope is much more limited. The adoption of

common standards represents an important decision in the degree of integration between two

countries as eliminates the possibility of discrimination of grounds of non-compliance on TBTs

and SPSs. Nevertheless, even in very deep agreements such as the European Union, there can

still be differences in standards between countries. This can be dealt with by the principle of

mutual recognition. Hence mutual recognition in the EU guarantees that a product legally

marketed in one Member and not subject to harmonisation through the EU must be allowed to

be marketed in any other Member state even when it may not be in full compliance with the

technical rules of the Member State of destination.

This should not be mistaken with the mutual recognition agreements in FTAs by which

signatories will accept the certificates of conformity issued by the conformity assessments

bodies of the other signatory parties. Generally, the mutual recognition agreements include

lists of designated laboratories, bodies and other institutions in every signatory. The EU, for

example, has mutual recognition agreements with Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and

the US. Some countries therefore, and perhaps particularly developing countries, may choose

to adopt the other country’s standards with the objective of securing access to that market.

This is an easy and fast way of adopting best international practices and remain competitive in

the destination market. There is evidence (Clougherty and Grajek, 2008) and (Grajek, 2004)